Risk perception, risk communication, and risk management by Gurian, Patrick L.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
College of Engineering 
    
      
 
Drexel E-Repository and Archive (iDEA) 
http://idea.library.drexel.edu/   
 
 
Drexel University Libraries 
www.library.drexel.edu
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following item is made available as a courtesy to scholars by the author(s) and Drexel University Library and may 
contain materials and content, including computer code and tags, artwork, text, graphics, images, and illustrations 
(Material) which may be protected by copyright law. Unless otherwise noted, the Material is made available for non 
profit and educational purposes, such as research, teaching and private study. For these limited purposes, you may 
reproduce (print, download or make copies) the Material without prior permission. All copies must include any 
copyright notice originally included with the Material. You must seek permission from the authors or copyright 
owners for all uses that are not allowed by fair use and other provisions of the U.S. Copyright Law. The 
responsibility for making an independent legal assessment and securing any necessary permission rests with persons 
desiring to reproduce or use the Material. 
 
 
Please direct questions to archives@drexel.edu
 
Risk Perception, Risk Communication, and Risk Management 
 
Patrick L. Gurian 
Drexel University 
pgurian@drexel.edu 
 
Goal 
This chapter considers the social science of risk, that is, how society responds to risk. This 
societal response is typically viewed from three perspectives. One is the descriptive perspective 
which addresses the question “How do people perceive and react to risk?” A second viewpoint is 
prescriptive, concerned with the question of “How should we communicate with members of 
society about risk?” A third viewpoint is normative and asks “How should we manage this risk?” 
Each of these perspectives is addressed briefly below. 
 
Risk Perception  
It became apparent fairly soon after a quantitative science of risk assessment was developed that 
experts and the public perceive risks in different ways. Cognitive psychologists investigating 
these discrepancies developed a body of knowledge related to how both experts and the public 
perceive risk (Slovic 1987, Slovic et al. 1980, Slovic et al. 2004). It was found that expert 
assessments of risk were driven largely by the expected number of fatalities. On the other hand, 
the public’s perception of risk was actually richer in that it was based on a far broader range of 
factors. For example, public perception of risk is driven by not only expected fatalities but also 
factors such as the newness of the technology, the threat that the technology might present to 
future generations, the dread that the technology inspires on a gut level, the uncertainty 
associated with the risk, whether exposure to the risk is voluntary or involuntary, and many other 
attributes. In fact, responses to a very wide range of questions can be correlated to the public’s 
perception of risk. However, many of these questions would touch on the same underlying 
factor. For example, the gut level dread inspired by a risk and its catastrophic potential would 
likely be highly correlated, since both stem from the possibility that a technology might have the 
potential to produce massive numbers of casualties in the event of a malfunction. A statistical 
technique called factor analysis can be used to interpret highly correlated responses on surveys in 
terms of a much smaller number of underlying factors.  
 
In the case of risk perception, three underlying factors have commonly been identified. The first 
is usually labeled “dread” and encompasses factors such as the gut-level, emotional reaction 
inspired by the risk, the threat the risk presents to future generations, and the catastrophic 
potential of the risk (i.e., potential to produce mass casualties). The second factor is 
“familiarity”.  This includes whether the risk is old or new, whether the risk is well understood 
by science or poorly understood by science, and whether it is something the public deals with on 
a daily basis or that is less commonly encountered by the public. The third common factor is the 
number of people exposed to the risk. Scores on each of these factors can be computed, and the 
location of a particular risk in this factor space identified. Figure 1 is an example of such a plot 
with the x-axis showing the factors score on the dread factor, and the y-axis showing the factor 
score on the familiarity factor. 
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Figure 1. Location of risks in factor space (based on Slovic et al. 1980). 
 
Nuclear power is notable as it occupies the space at the extreme upper right hand quadrant of the 
factor space. As nuclear power is considered both unfamiliar and dread, it is a high-profile risk 
that elicits concern on the part of the public. In general risks in the upper right hand corner of 
Figure 1 are higher profile risks, which will attract more public attention. Conversely risks in the 
lower left hand quadrant scored low on both of these two factors and will tend to attract less 
public attention and concern. While this conceptual framework is very helpful in describing how 
the public response to various risks, its ability as a predictive framework to anticipate how the 
public will react to any particular risk has not been established.  
 
It is also worth noting how this body of literature is often summarized in an overly simplistic 
fashion. In some cases public perception of risk may be described as being driven solely by 
“dread”. In other cases, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary risks may be presented 
as the only distinction that the public makes. It is true that emotional factors, such as “dread” 
impact public perception of risk, and it is also true that the public tolerates higher levels of risk 
for voluntary activities such as paragliding, than for involuntary activities, such as living in an 
area where a nuclear power plant is proposed to be located. Nevertheless, one should be mindful 
that public perception is driven not just by these two factors of dread and voluntariness, but by a 
very wide variety of other factors as well. 
 
A second framework for understanding the public perception of risk is based on understanding 
the distinction between analytical and affective thought. Analytical thought is what the experts 
do in the formal process of risk assessment. It consists of applying systematic methods and 
mathematical models to developing quantitative estimates of risk. In contrast, affective thought is 
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an emotional, gut-level response. While the analytical approaches to risk assessment are 
considered more precise and accurate than affective approaches, affective methods can actually 
be seen as necessary shortcuts for coping with the large number of risks we face given limited 
cognitive resources. Affective responses can be seen as a sort of heuristic approach to risk 
assessment.  
 
As an example, one can consider how the two different systems can be applied to the same risk 
problem. An individual considering buying an automobile might compare the fatality risks and 
costs of different models. The risk reduction could be converted to an equivalent monetary value 
using benchmark values for rate of investment to avert fatal risk. The individual could then select 
the model with the lowest sum of monetized risk and purchasing price. Another individual might 
lack either the training or necessary information to conduct this quantitative assessment and 
might instead simply buy a vehicle that is rated as highly safe by a trusted consumer watchdog 
group. 
 
Figure 2 shows a framework suggested by Slovic et al. (2004) for understanding how affective 
assessments function. An overall assessment is first developed which then impacts the perceived 
costs and benefits of the risk. For example, nuclear power may have a highly negative affective 
response due to concerns over a Chernobyl-scale release of radioactivity. This negative affect 
will influence assessments of the benefits of nuclear power to be low and costs to be high. In 
contrast, in the analytical system the risk of a catastrophic failure would be weighted by its 
probability of occurrence (presumably very low). In addition the costs and benefits are typically 
separate calculations. 
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Figure 2. Influence of affect on perceived risks and perceived benefits (Slovic 2004). 
 
While affective thinking is a necessary shortcut to enable us to live our daily lives, it also has 
real weaknesses. For example, cigarette smoking may be associated with positive affect (peer 
acceptance, effects of nicotine, etc.) which leads individuals to downplay risk estimates in their 
decision to smoke (Slovic et al. 2004).  
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Risk Communication 
The discussion above has contrasted public and expert views of risk but has not addressed how 
one should reconcile them.  This is the prescriptive issue of “How should one give advice to the 
public about how to deal with difficult technological risk issues?” Clearly a first step is 
recognizing that the public will view risks differently from how experts view risks, and 
recognizing that the public’s broad, multi-attribute view of risk is in many ways legitimate. One 
should not expect the public to drop their risk preferences in favor of those of expert assessors. 
Nevertheless there are times when experts really do have important information which could 
help inform public preferences and actions regarding risks.  
 
The Mental Models risk communication framework is a method to target risk communication 
efforts at the key knowledge deficiencies in the public (Morgan et al. 2002). A risk 
communication effort should not waste time telling people what they already know. Instead it 
should empirically determine what people know and do not know and direct risk communication 
efforts towards the latter. 
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Figure 3. The Mental Models risk communication framework. 
 
Figure 3 shows the key steps in the mental models framework. First expert knowledge is 
compiled into an expert model of the risk through a review of the literature and interviews with 
subject matter experts. Then a series of semi-structured interviews are conducted with members 
of the public. The interviewer first asks the subject to describe his or her knowledge about the 
particular risk. The interviewer then asks follow-up questions aimed at eliciting the subjects’ 
causal understanding of the process. Interview transcripts are analyzed to identify deviations 
between the expert and public models. The semi-structured interviews are an exploratory 
research technique to aid in the development of hypotheses as to what are common and 
important deviations between public and expert understanding. However, they are very time 
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consuming which limits the number that can be performed. Because of the small sample size, 
one cannot conclude definitively how frequently a given misconception occurs among members 
of the public. For this reason the semi-structured interviews are followed by a more structured 
elicitation of public knowledge, often in the form of a written survey. This survey questions 
respondents about particular misconceptions or information gaps which are hypothesized to be 
prevalent in the subject population, based on the results of the semi-structured interviews. 
 
After the structured survey is completed, the data are analyzed to assess the frequency of 
particular misconceptions and gaps in the subject population. One must determine whether these 
gaps occur frequently enough in the subject population to merit their inclusion in a risk 
communication instrument. One must consider not only frequency of occurrence of different 
information gaps, but also how frequently this information gap would lead to an incorrect 
decision. Some knowledge deficiencies may be more or less harmless, while other information 
deficiencies can lead to incorrect decisions and for this reason should receive priority in risk 
communication efforts. Once the key information gaps to be addressed have been identified, 
information designed to address these knowledge deficiencies is put into a risk communication 
instrument, such as a pamphlet or video. The next step in the mental models framework is the 
evaluation of this risk communication instrument. This may be done through a simple pretest and 
posttest in which subjects’ knowledge is assessed before they are exposed to the instrument and 
after they are exposed to the instrument. If any problems are identified with the instrument, then 
the instrument should be revised to address these problems, and the revised instrument should be 
we evaluated empirically again. This process of revision and reevaluation is repeated as often as 
necessary in order to develop a satisfactory risk communication instrument. 
 
While the Mental Models risk communication framework has been effectively applied to several 
different risks, this is not to say that there is a simple algorithm for how to undertake risk 
communication.  Often decisions about risk involve difficult tradeoffs and serious conflicts 
between expert and public valuations of risk. The simple provision of additional information will 
not necessarily resolve these conflicts even if the information that is to be provided has been 
precisely targeted at key knowledge gaps by the Mental Models framework  
 
While there is no simple algorithm for how to deal with difficult risk communication issues, 
there are at least some guidelines that have been learned from past experience. Fischhoff (1995) 
reviewed how such guidelines have evolved over the course of twenty years and summarized 
eight stages in the historical evolution of risk communication: 
 
1. All we need to do is get the numbers right 
2. All we have to do is tell them the numbers 
3. All we nave to do is explain what we mean by the numbers 
4. All we have to do is show them that they’ve accepted similar risks in the 
past 
5. All we have to do is show them that it’s a good deal for them 
6. All we have to do is treat them with respect 
7. All we have to do is make them partners 
8. All of the above 
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This process evolved from one that did not involve the public, to one that involved the public as 
passive receivers of risk information, and finally to one in which the public is a partner in the 
risk management process. While one cannot formulate universally effective guidelines for risk 
communication, the best chances for success lie in adopting an attitude of respect for the public’s 
point of view and ongoing engagement with the public. This engagement should seek to instruct 
the public and improve their knowledge of the issue and also to learn from the public what their 
concerns are and what their values are. 
 
Risk Management 
Risk management is the process of deciding how one ought to respond to risks. While one would 
clearly like to eliminate all risks, this is not feasible goal. People willingly accept risks when they 
undertake a wide range of activities, such as driving automobiles, crossing the street, and eating a 
hamburger. The question of whether a risk is acceptable is not a purely technical question. 
Rather it is a question that depends on values. While it might simplify matters if we could set a 
simple threshold for acceptable risk, perhaps a one in a million lifetime risk, and say that 
activities more risky than this are “unacceptable” and those less risky than this are “acceptable”, 
there are two reasons why this approach does not work. The first is related to the above 
discussion of risk perception. The public does not react to risk simply in terms of its expected 
annual fatalities. Thus the acceptability of a risk in the public’s eyes is not simply a matter of the 
probabilities of fatality but includes other aspects of the activity, such as whether the activities 
are undertaken voluntarily whether the process that leads to the risk is a new process or an old 
and familiar process, and whether their risk provokes a gut level, emotional dread reaction or not. 
This aspect of defining acceptable risk must be worked through using the process of risk 
communication and engagement described above. 
 
There is a second issue as well. Some activities are considered essential and must be tolerated 
even if they produce relatively high risks. In other cases there may be inexpensive alternatives to 
the activity which are less risky or modifications to the activity which make it less risky. In these 
cases the risk might well be judged unacceptable because such readily available alternatives 
exist.  
 
This second issue is an economic issue in that deals with the question of how many resources 
one should devote to reducing a risk. In other words, what dollar amount should one be willing 
to spend to reduce risk by a given amount. As with all economic problems one must consider 
risks not in terms of absolute values but in terms of the incremental differences between 
alternatives. Often it is not possible to completely eliminate risk; rather one must choose among 
different risks.  
 
Just as there is no single acceptable threshold of allowable risk, there is also no single 
appropriate monetized value for risk reduction. Societal willingness to invest in risk reduction 
depends on the wide range of factors that drive risk perception, such as the dread associated with 
the risk, its catastrophic potential, etc. In a review of attempts to estimate values from labor 
market premiums for accepting more dangerous employment, Viscusi and Aldy (2003) conclude 
that a range of $4-9 million is typical. 
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Risk assessors typically seek to perform the technical task of providing objective information to 
risk managers and try to avoid making value judgments or imposing a particular preferred 
solution. Thus, they are generally cautious about assigning a particular dollar value to a given 
reduction in risk. Instead analyses are customarily done in terms of cost-effectiveness, in which 
different prospective risk management measures are evaluated, and quantitative estimates of their 
costs and reduction in risk are determined. The cost divided by the reduction in risk is the cost-
effectiveness of the measure.  
 
One might assume that the most cost-effective solution would be preferred, but this is not 
necessarily the case. Like most economic goods, risk-reduction strategies tend to exhibit 
declining marginal returns. One naturally pursues the less expensive measures first, and then if 
one seeks additional risk reduction, one must pursue more expensive measures. Thus the most 
cost-effective solution will typically also be the solution their results in the least overall 
reduction in risk. 
 
Gurian et al. (2001) provide an example of one such risk management situation. This study 
examined the costs and risk reduction achieved by different drinking water standards for arsenic. 
A standard of 20µg/l was estimated to save 47 lives per year and cost $120 million/year. Its cost-
effectiveness is therefore $2.6 million/life saved. If the standard is set at 10µg/l, it was estimated 
that compliance would cost $300 million/year and 55 lives would be saved for a cost-
effectiveness of $5.5 million/life. However, this is not the appropriate manner in which to assess 
the cost-effectiveness of the 10µg/l standard. Instead one should consider the additional, or 
incremental, lives saved and the additional costs incurred by selecting 10 instead of 20. From an 
intuitive viewpoint, most of the lives saved by the 10µg/l standard will also be saved by the 
20µg/l standard. One should not give the 10µg/l standard credit for these lives which would have 
been saved by the less costly standard. A similar argument applies on the cost side. Thus the 
appropriate estimate of the cost effectiveness of the 10 µg/l standard is: 
 
(cost of 10µg/l - cost of 20 µg/l) – (benefit of 10µg/l - benefit of 20 µg/l) 
 
Using the numbers from Gurian et al. (2001): 
 
(300-120) / (55-47) = $22.5 million/life. 
 
Note that this incremental value is much greater than the average value of $5.5 million/life. A 
decision to regulate at 10µg/l implies a value of statistical life that is greater than $22.5 
million/life, while a decision to set the standard at 20µg/l implies a value of statistical life that is 
less than $22.5 million but greater than 2.6 million.  
 
Figure 4 shows a simple example of how this type of analysis can be conducted for multiple, 
discrete risk management options. Based on technical knowledge, the analyst first calculates the 
risk reduction and costs of each option. Each option can then be plotted as a point with lives 
saved on the x-axis and cost on the y-axis. A point which is above and to the left of another 
option is dominated by the other option, because this other option offers greater risk reduction at 
lower cost (i.e., is superior on both attributes). The set of non-dominated options can thus be 
connected by an upward sloping line. Due to decreasing marginal returns, the slope is almost 
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always continuously increasing. Thus one can calculate the slope of the line connecting the point 
in the lowest left corner to the next highest and to the right. This slope is the incremental cost 
effectiveness of implementing the more costly measure. Decision makers can then be informed 
that selecting an option to the right of a given line implies a statistical value of life larger than the 
slope of the line. Likewise, selection of an option to the left of a given line implies a value of life 
lower than the slope of the line. 
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Figure 4. Implicit value of life for three different risk management alternatives, A, B, and C. 
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